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Comment on “Quantum string seal is insecure”
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics & Engineering and Advanced Research Center,
Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, People’s Republic of China
Recently an attack strategy was proposed by Chau [H. F. Chau, quant-ph/0602099 v3], which was
claimed to be able to break all quantum string seal protocols, including the one proposed by He [G.
P. He, Int. J. Quant. Inform. 4, 677 (2006)]. Here it will be shown that the information obtained
in He’s protocol by the attack is trivial. Thus Chau’s conclusion that all quantum string seals are
insecure is wrong. It will also be shown that some other claims in Chau’s paper are inaccurate
either.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.20.Ff, 89.70.+c
In a recent paper [1], Chau claimed that all quantum
string seals are insecure. The core of Chau’s attack strat-
egy is the measurement
Qi0 = aI + b |i〉 〈i| . (1)
(see Eq. (29) of that reference). It was claimed that with
this measurement, the attacker can obtain non-trivial in-
formation on the sealed string while escapes the verifier’s
detection with at least 50% chance. However, the paper
concentrated only on the fidelity of the sealed state corre-
sponding to the attacker’s measurement, without provid-
ing a detailed evaluation on the amount of information
obtained by the attacker. Here it will be shown that for
a class of quantum string seal protocols including the one
proposed by He [2], this amount of information is only
trivial. Therefore in contrast to Chau’s claim, quantum
string seal can be unconditionally secure.
In fact, the general proof on why Chau’s attack strat-
egy fails had already been well addressed in Ref. [3].
Briefly, consider a simple model of imperfect quantum
string seal, in which the sealed state for the message i′ is
taken as ∣∣∣ψ˜i′
〉
=
∑
j′
λi′j′ |ψj′ 〉B , (2)
where the notation is the same as that in Eq. (1) of Ref.
[1]. Applying the measurement Qi0 on it yields
Qi0
∣∣∣ψ˜i′
〉
= (a+ b)λi′i |i〉+ a
∑
j 6=i
λi′j |j〉 . (3)
Thus the probability for the message i′ to be decoded as
i by the attacker is
pi′i = a
2 + (2ab+ b2)λ2i′i
=
1− ν
N
+ νλ2i′i, (4)
where ν is defined by Eq. (12) of Ref. [1]. According to
Sec. IV of Ref. [1], by fixing ν = 1/2, the attacker can
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escapes the verifier’s detection at least half of the time,
so that all quantum seals are claimed to be insecure. But
in this case, the above equation becomes
pi′i =
1
2N
+
λ2i′i
2
. (5)
It means that any one of the N possible choices of the
message i′ has at least the probability 1/(2N) to be de-
coded as message i, even if its content is completely ir-
relevant with i. In other words, whenever the attacker
obtains a message i via the measurement strategy, there
is at less a probability pi =
∑
i′ 1/(2N) = 1/2 that the
original message can be anything, i. e., the amount of
information he obtained is zero. Thus it can be seen
that the attack strategy is useless. Though at half of the
time it can escape the verifier’s detection, the amount of
information obtained on the sealed message is only triv-
ial. Therefore Chau’s claim that all quantum seals are
insecure is wrong.
Now it will be shown that the protocol proposed in Ref.
[2] is indeed such a secure quantum string seal. In this
protocol, to seal a string i′ = i′
1
i′
2
...i′m... (i
′
m ∈ {0, 1}),
the sealed state is taken as
∣∣∣ψ˜i′
〉
=
∑
m⊗
∣∣∣ψ˜i′
m
〉
where∣∣∣ψ˜i′
m
〉
= cos θm |i′m〉+ sin θm
∣∣i′m〉. Thus by taking
λi′j′ =
∏
m
fm(θm), (6)
where fm(θm) is cos θm (sin θm) if the m-th bit of the
string j′ equals to (does not equal to) that of the string
i′, we can see that the protocol belongs to the class of
quantum string seal described by Eq. (2). Therefore
as shown above, it cannot be broken by Chau’s attack
strategy.
In Sec. IV of Ref. [1], it was claimed that “the ma-
jor loophole in He’s proof of the security of his quantum
string seal in Ref. [2] is that he incorrectly assumed that
measuring all the qubits is the only method to obtain a
significant portion of information of the sealed message”.
But this is obviously incorrect. In the paragraph before
Eq. (5) of Ref. [2], it was clearly written that the gen-
eral security proof starts as follows. Let H denotes the
2n dimensional Hilbert space where the sealed state lives
2in, and V denotes the space where the final state lives in
after the attacker performs certain POVMs. Note that
no restriction was ever put on V . V can even equal to H
if the attacker’s POVMs do not contain any projection
operator which will make the sealed state collapse. Thus
every possible case is covered by the security proof fol-
lowing that paragraph. There is no such assumption as
mentioned in Chau’s claim.
It was also claimed in the same section of Ref. [1]
that the analog of the attack strategy proposed in Ref.
[3] is not optimal. In this analog, the attacker needs no
quantum computer to perform the collective measure-
ment in Eq. (1). He can simply toss a coin to decide
his action. At half of the cases he performs the hon-
est measurement suggested by the quantum string seal
protocol and reads the string, while at the other half of
the cases he does nothing. This is completely equivalent
to the ν = 1/2 case of Chau’s attack strategy, because
substituting ν = 1/2 into Eq. (1) gives
Qi0 =
√
1
2N
I + (
√
1
2
+
1
2N
−
√
1
2N
) |i〉 〈i| . (7)
Due to the linearity of quantum mechanics, we can see
that applying the measurement Qi0 (i = 0, ..., N − 1)
on the sealed state is equivalent to applying the identity
operator I (which actually means doing nothing) with
the probability 1/2. The merit of the analog is that it
can help us understand clearly why Chau’s attack can
escape the verifier’s detection at half of the cases – simply
because the attacker has done nothing at these cases.
More generally, by tossing a biased coin, the attacker
can have a corresponding analog of Chau’s strategy for
any ν value. Therefore Chau’s claiming that the analog
of the attack strategy is not optimal sounds confusing. It
seems to indicate that the optimal strategy should have
ν = 1 instead of ν = 1/2. If so, Eq. (1) becomes
Qi0 = |i〉 〈i| . (8)
Then Eq. (3) shows that after applying Qi0 on
∣∣∣ψ˜i′
〉
, the
final state will collapse to |i〉 with the probability λ2i′i.
Thus the average fidelity of the final state is
∑
i λ
4
i′i,
which is arbitrarily small as N increases. Therefore it
cannot escape the verifier’s detection. That is, the re-
sults in Ref. [1] corresponding to different ν values in
fact shows that if the amount of information obtained by
the attack measurement is optimized, the probability of
escaping the detection will be trivial, or vice versa. In
either case, Chau’s strategy is not a successful attack.
In addition, there is also a misleading claim in the
introduction of Ref. [1] (which also appeared in Ref.
[4]). It was claimed that the security bounds of imper-
fect quantum single bit seal obtained by He [5] are not
tight, while Chau proved that all imperfect quantum bit
seals are insecure, and obtained a greater lower bound
[4]. But in fact, Chau’s model of quantum bit seal stud-
ied in Ref. [4] is less general than that of He’s in Ref.
[5], and Chau’s bound is not tighter. More rigorously,
in He’s model, measuring the sealed states can result in
three outcome sets G0, G1 and {g /∈ G0 ∪ G1}, where
G0 and G1 are corresponding to the decoded bit values 0
and 1 respectively, while {g /∈ G0 ∪ G1} tells the reader
that the decoding fails [5]. Also, the maximum proba-
bility α for the sealed bit b to be read correctly can be
kept secret from the reader. Let β denotes the prob-
ability for the reading operation to be detected by the
verifier. By proposing an explicit cheating strategy, two
security bounds β 6 1/2 and α+ β 6 9/8 were obtained
in Ref. [5]. But in Ref. [4], Chau’s model covers a spe-
cial case of He’s model only, where {g /∈ G0 ∪ G1} = ∅
and α (denoted as qmax in that reference) is known to
the reader (otherwise his cheating measurement cannot
be constructed). The lower bound for the fidelity of the
resultant state (equivalent to 1−β) was also found, which
was said to be greater than 1/2. But in fact, the greater
lower bound is achieved only when the amount of infor-
mation obtained by the cheater drops. From the analog
of the attack strategy proposed in Ref. [3] it can easily
be seen that this result is not significant, because if the
cheater reads the sealed bit only with a small probability,
the fidelity of the resultant state is surely greater. Also,
the result is in agreement with β 6 1/2, while no analog
to the finding α + β 6 9/8 of Ref. [5] was found in Ref.
[4]. For this reason, the remark on Refs. [5] in Ref. [1, 4]
is improper.
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